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Abstract
Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociol-
ogists. A Balanced Outcome [10, 16] for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines
notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and Tardos [14] introduced bal-
anced outcomes to the computer science community and provided a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute the set of such outcomes. Their work left open a pertinent question: are there
natural, local dynamics that converge quickly to a balanced outcome? In this paper, we provide
a partial answer to this question by showing that simple edge-balancing dynamics converge to
a balanced outcome whenever one exists.
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1 Introduction
Exchange networks and their properties have been well-studied by sociologists and economists,
who have often made similar discoveries independently. For a sociologist, an exchange is any
social interaction based on reciprocity. For an economist, an exchange is a trade that generates a
surplus for the parties involved. A network of exchanges arises when there are multiple players
involved in pairwise exchanges but when the potential pairings between players are limited.
The object of interest in such networks is how the players bargain for the surplus generated by
exchanges, and how the outcome depends on the topology of the network. In sociology, this is
studied using network exchange theory [21], and in economics it is studied using cooperative
game theory [18, 20].
Interaction in such exchange networks takes the form of the following bargaining game [10,
20], defined by a graph G = (V,E) with edge weights w : E → Z+. Each node of the graph is
a player, and the weight on an edge signifies the value generated by an exchange between the
two players connected by the edge. Any two players that are connected by an edge are allowed
to negotiate on how to split the value on the edge. Eventually, however, each player is allowed
an exchange with only one other player. An outcome of such a game corresponds to a matching
M , which represents the pairs of players involved in an exchange, and a vector x describing each
player’s allocation of the value generated by the exchange. If xu is the allocation of node u in
the outcome, then for all edges uv ∈ M , we have xu + xv = wu,v, and for all u /∈ M , we have
xu = 0.
There are various notions of equilibrium that are intended to capture rational play in this
game. The most basic and natural one is that of a stable outcome. In such an outcome, no
two players have an unrealised exchange that is better for each of them than their realised
exchanges; in other words, xu + xv ≥ wu,v for all unmatched edges uv. Stability, however, is a
mild restriction that does not fully capture the bargaining aspect of the game. Rochford [16],
and independently, Cook and Yamagishi [10], introduced the notion of balanced outcomes, which
has been found to match experimental data on such games quite well [8, 9]. Balanced outcomes
can be seen as a generalization of Nash’s bargaining solution for two players [15], so we describe
that first. Suppose that two players have a dollar to split among themselves if they agree how
to split it. Each player also has an alternative which is his utility in case they disagree.1 If
the alternatives of the two players are α1 and α2, then Nash’s bargaining solution suggests that
they split the surplus s = 1 − (α1 + α2) equally if it is positive, and disagree otherwise. That
is, the players get α1 + s2 and α2 +
s
2 if s ≥ 0. For the network bargaining game, an outcome
is balanced if it is stable and the value of each realised exchange is split according to Nash’s
bargaining solution. However, as opposed to the exogenously given alternatives in Nash’s game,
the alternatives in the network bargaining game are given indigenously, to be the maximum value
a player can get by executing an exchange with a neighbor other than his match and offering
that neighbor the same value that he is currently getting. More precisely, the alternative of a
node u is αu = max{0,maxv:uv∈E\M{wu,v − xv}}. In a recent work that brought this concept
into the realm of computer science, Kleinberg and Tardos [14] gave a polynomial-time algorithm
to compute the set of balanced outcomes.
Kleinberg and Tardos asked a pertinent question left open by their work: “are there natural,
local dynamics that converge to a balanced outcome?” In fact, Rochford [16] and Cook and
Yamagishi [10] already define one such process. This process, which we call the edge-balancing
dynamics, assumes that the players have determined their matches and are just negotiating on
their allocations. With this matching M fixed, the process works as follows: for a matched edge
uv, let the surplus be su,v = wu,v−(αu+αv). If the edge is not already balanced, then rebalance
it by setting xu and xv to the values suggested by Nash’s bargaining solution: xu ← αu + su,v2
and xv ← αv + su,v2 . Do this even if the surplus su,v is negative – unless doing this would make
xu or xv negative, that is, unless αu +
su,v
2 < 0 or αv +
su,v
2 < 0. In the first of these cases, set
xu ← 0 and xv ← wu,v, and in the second, set xu ← wu,v and xv ← 0. In this way, the allocation
1This is also sometimes called the disagreement point.
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on each edge is set to be as close to balanced as possible while maintaining the condition that
xu and xv are always non-negative and add up to wu,v.2
In order to completely specify the dynamics, one has to specify the order in which the
edges are rebalanced and the initial state. For instance, if all matched edges are simultaneously
rebalanced, then it is easy to show that the dynamics may cycle. On the other hand, if the
dynamics start at a particular state, then it is easy to show that they converge. (More on this
in the section on related results.) In order to be as general as possible, we consider an arbitrary
order of edges and an arbitrary initial state. Our main result is that the edge-balancing dynamics
converge to a balanced outcome whenever one exists with matching M .
In fact, it is not even clear that a fixed point of this process is a balanced outcome. This
is because, at a fixed point, the surplus of an edge could be negative, or worse, it could be so
negative that αu +
su,v
2 < 0 and we set xu ← 0, and xv ← wu,v. In Section 3, we show examples
where the edge-balancing dynamics do indeed get stuck on such an outcome. However, in each
of these examples, it can be seen that there is no balanced outcome with respect to the given
matching M . To prove our result, we need to argue that this is always the case: the dynamics
can only get stuck in such a way if there is no balanced outcome with M . To do this, we show
that if a fixed point is not a balanced outcome, then an “exploration” algorithm always finds a
structure in the graph that acts as a witness to the non-existence of a balanced outcome.
The convergence proof uses a potential function argument. Given the potential function, the
proof of convergence is fairly easy. However, the potential function we use is somewhat peculiar,
owing to the fact that many natural potential functions do not work. This is because balancing
one matched edge might lead to an increase in the imbalance of many other edges. In fact, the
only special case where we know an alternate (easier) potential function is the case of a path.
In our dynamics we assume that we are given a matching M . One might ask why this
assumption is justified. Besides seeing it as a natural starting point for research in understanding
more realistic dynamics, we also make the following observation: the message passing algorithm
of [4, 5, 19] for finding maximum matchings can be thought of as a first phase in which the
players converge to a matching before they use our dynamics as a second phase to compute
their allocation. The messages of this algorithm have a natural interpretation as offers (which
is not surprising, since the algorithm has been shown to be equivalent to the auction algorithm
of [6]). We elaborate on this in Appendix A.
Other Related Work
The bipartite version of the bargaining game was introduced by Shapley and Shubik [20], who
called it the assignment game. Assignment games can also be thought of as a variant of the
two-sided markets of Gale and Shapley [13] with transferable utilities. Assignment games have
been the subject of numerous papers in game theory. The most relevant to our paper is that of
Rochford [16], who also defined balanced outcomes for such games (under the name “pairwise-
bargained allocations”). Rochford also considered a simplified version of our edge-balancing
dynamics, and showed that if the initial state is one of two special points, then the process
converges to a balanced outcome. The issue of characterizing the fixed points does not arise in
Rochford’s work since the initial states are such that the allocations are always guaranteed to
be stable. Also, the special initial states give a natural monotonicity property that is lacking
when considering arbitrary starting points.
Papers in a similar vein that consider price setting through a bargaining processes include
the work by Corominas-Bosch [11]. At a meta-level, the convergence of local dynamics to a
global equilibrium is a common theme. Ackerman et. al [1] showed an exponential lower bound
for random best-response dynamics for the Gale-Shapley stable matching game [13]. Several
papers [3, 7, 17] have studied the convergence of best-response dynamics to Nash equilibria in
congestion games. In terms of structural results, Driessen [12] shows that the kernel is included
2Actually the process as defined by Rochford and Cook and Yamigishi is simpler because they only consider initial
conditions in which the surplus is always guaranteed to be non-negative.
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in the core of an assignment game. This is in a similar spirit to one of the structural results we
prove (Proposition 5).
Future Directions
The rate of convergence of the dynamics is obviously important. However, the edge-balancing
dynamics may not reach an exact balanced outcome in finite time.3 Therefore, we define a
notion of sufficiently balanced outcomes, which helps in measuring the rate. This gives a bound
that is exponential in the size of the graph, and linear in 1/ε where ε is the approximation
parameter. Bringing the rate down to a polynomial in the input size is a major open problem.
To do this, one might also consider the process in which the edge to be balanced is picked
uniformly at random.
Another direction of research is to remove the assumption that there is a fixed matching.
Although this assumption is partially justified by our observation regarding the message passing
algorithm of [4, 5, 19], it would be more satisfying to have dynamics that naturally mix the
process of finding a matching and bargaining across the edges of the matching.
2 The Edge-Balancing Dynamics
Let M be a matching on a graph G = (V,E) with weights w : E → Z+. Let x ∈ RV+ be an
allocation on V . We have already defined stable and balanced outcomes. It is also useful to
define stable and balanced edges. An edge uv 6∈ M is stable if xu + xv ≥ wu,v and unstable
otherwise. An edge uv ∈M is balanced if its endpoints satisfy Nash’s bargaining solution, that
is, if the surplus is not negative (su,v = wu,v −αu−αv ≥ 0) and the values at the endpoints are
xu = αu + su,v/2 and xv = αv + su,v/2.
We introduce the term quasi-balanced to denote an edge uv ∈M such that xu = αu + su,v/2
and xv = αv + su,v/2, regardless of whether or not su,v ≥ 0. In a quasi-balanced outcome every
matched edge is quasi-balanced. Recall that a balanced outcome is a stable outcome in which
the endpoints of each edge satisfy Nash’s bargaining solution. This implies in particular that in
a balanced outcome, each matched edge must have positive surplus. However, it is not hard to
show that the stability condition alone implies the positive surplus of the matched edges. Hence,
balanced outcomes are equivalent to stable quasi-balanced outcomes; this is the characterization
we will use.
We define one other type of matched edge for clarity in describing situations in which the
surplus is negative. We say that an edge uv ∈M is unhappy if αu+su,v/2 < 0 or αv+su,v/2 < 0.
That is, an edge is unhappy whenever the edge-balancing dynamics suggest a negative value for
an endpoint. We say that vertex v is saturated if the unhappy edge uv ∈M is as close to being
balanced as it can get without causing xu to be negative, namely, αu + su,v/2 < 0, xv = wu,v
and xu = 0. We call an edge saturated if one of its endpoints is saturated.
With these definitions, we now formally describe the edge-balancing dynamics.
3This is easily seen, even for a path on 4 nodes, since the edge-balancing dynamics may be made to always have
numbers whose denominators are powers of 2, whereas a balanced outcome has values 1/3 and 2/3.
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(a) Fixed point that is not quasi-
balanced.
1 1
12
2
4 3
3
(b) Fixed point that is quasi-
balanced, but not stable.
Figure 1: Examples of fixed points of the edge-balancing dynamics that are not, in fact, balanced. In
Figure 1(a), the fixed point is not quasi-balanced and in Figure 1(b), the fixed point is quasi-balanced but
not stable. However, it can be shown that there is no balanced outcome with either of these matchings.
Edge-Balancing Dynamics
Let x be an arbitrary allocation with respect to M .
Repeat:
Choose any edge uv ∈M that is not quasi-balanced or saturated.4
Let αu and αv be the best alternates for u and v.
Let x′u = αu + su,v/2, and
Let x′v = αv + su,v/2.
If x′u < 0 (that is uv is unhappy with αu < αv)
Set xu ← 0 and xv ← wu,v.
Else if x′v < 0 (that is uv is unhappy with αu > αv)
Set xu ← wu,v and xv ← 0.
Else
Set xu ← x′u and xv ← x′v.
Clearly we maintain the invariant that xu + xv = wu,v for all uv ∈M , and if z 6∈M then xz
does not change. Thus, at any point in the dynamics, x is a valid allocation with respect to M .
In a fixed point of these dynamics, every matched edge is either quasi-balanced or unhappy with
a saturated endpoint, and unmatched edges may or may not be stable. Thus there can be (and
are) examples of fixed points that are not quasi-balanced or stable (see Figure 1). However, our
main result shows that in any such example there is no balanced outcome on matching M .
Theorem 1. If there exists a balanced outcome on M , then any fixed point of the edge-balancing
dynamics is balanced.
This theorem is proved in Section 3. In Section 4, we prove that the dynamics converge to
a fixed point.
Theorem 2. For any initial allocation x and any matching M , the edge-balancing dynamics
converge to a fixed point.
3 Fixed Point Characterization
Since a stable outcome must be on a maximum weight matching [14, 20], a balanced outcome
must also be on a maximum weight matching. It is also known that if M is maximum, then a
balanced outcome with M exists if and only if a stable outcome on G exists [14, 16]. Hence, a
balanced outcome exists on a matching M if and only if M is a maximum matching and there
exists a stable outcome on G. A straightforward duality argument [14] shows that there exists
4We assume the natural non-starvation condition that each edge is considered an infinite number of times.
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a stable outcome on G if and only if a maximum fractional matching on G is integeral. Hence,
we have the following fact.
Fact 3. There exists a balanced outcome on matching M ⊆ G if and only if M is a maximum
fractional matching.
Note that in Figure 1, neither of the two matchings are maximum fractional matchings.
We will prove Theorem 1 in two steps. The first step is to show that when a balanced
outcome exists, a fixed point of the edge-balancing dynamics is quasi-balanced.
Proposition 4. If M is a maximum fractional matching and x is a fixed point of the edge-
balancing dynamics, then x has no unhappy edges (and is therefore quasi-balanced).
The second step is to show that, given these same conditions, a quasi-balanced allocation is
stable.
Proposition 5. If M is a maximum fractional matching and x is quasi-balanced, then x con-
tains no unstable edges (and is therefore balanced).
Combined with Fact 3, these two propositions prove Theorem 1.
Proposition 5 is of independent interest because it shows that although quasi-balanced is a
weaker notion than balanced, the two are equivalent on matchings that allow balanced outcomes.
In fact, we can prove a generalization that is motivated by practical concerns. Recall that
although the edge-balancing dynamics converge, they may not reach a fixed point in finite time.
However, once parties are sufficiently satisfied they may not want to negotiate further. Thus we
consider a notion of sufficiently quasi-balanced or sufficiently stable.
We say that allocation x is ε-quasi-balanced if the surplus is split evenly, to within an additive
constant of ε; namely every edge uv ∈ M satisfies |(xu − αu) − (xv − αv)| ≤ ε. Similarly, an
allocation is δ-stable if no two unmatched players have an unrealized exchange that is more than
δ better for them; namely xu + xv ≥ wu,v − δ for each edge uv 6∈ M . In light of Proposition 5,
one might ask if there is a similar relationship between ε-quasi-balanced and δ-stable. We settle
this question in the affirmative in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If M is a maximum fractional matching and x is an ε-quasi-balanced allocation
on M , then x is (nε)-stable, where n = |V (G)|.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows similar ideas as the proof of Proposition 5. We present this
proof in Appendix B, and show this bound is tight to within a constant factor.
The proofs of Propositions 4 and 5 share a common technique for proving the contrapositive.
We assume there exists an edge uv that is unhappy (in the case of Proposition 4) or an edge uv
that is unstable (in the case of Proposition 5). Starting from this edge, we explore the graph
along matched edges and best alternatives and show that this exploration must terminate by
finding a structure with properties that imply M is not a maximum fractional matching. This
exploration algorithm is shown below. To ease notation, we typically write wui,uj and xui simply
as wi,j and xi.
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(a) Capped : at least one endpoint
is matched. The other endpoint can
take any form.
(b) Lollypop: at least one endpoint
forms an alternating (even length) cy-
cle. The other endpoint can take any
form.
(c) Augmenting path: both end-
points are unmatched.
(d) Flower : one endpoint forms a
blossom (odd cycle), and the other
endpoint is unmatched.
(e) Bicycle: both endpoints form
disjoint blossoms.
(f) Pretzel : both endpoints form
blossoms which are not disjoint.
Figure 2: The exploration algorithm finds a subgraph H that can be classified in one of these six ways.
Matched edges are depicted in bold.
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Exploration Algorithm
Choose u0 ∈ V .
Let S = ∅ be the set of explored vertices.
For i = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . .
If ui ∈ S, break.
Else,
S ← S ∪ {ui}.
If i is even:
If ui 6∈M , break.
Else, let ui+1 = M(ui).
Else (i is odd):
If αi = 0, break.
Else, choose ui+1 ∼ ui such that αi = wi,i+1 − xi+1.
For i = 0,−1,−2,−3, . . .
If i < 0 and ui ∈ S, break.
Else,
S ← S ∪ {ui}.
If i is odd:
If ui 6∈M , break.
Else, let ui−1 = M(ui).
Else (i is even):
If αi = 0, break.
Else, choose ui−1 ∼ ui such that αi = wi,i−1 − xi−1.
Note that by the definition of best alternate αi, when αi > 0 a vertex ui′ ∼ ui exists such
that αi = wi,i′ − xi′ as desired. Thus, this dynamics are well defined. Let H be the subgraph
formed by the set of vertices S and the edges travelled in their discovery. Because both directions
of the exploration terminate if a vertex in S is rediscovered, the subgraph H can be classified
in one of the six ways shown in Figure 2.
Because the proof of Proposition 5 is simpler than the proof of Proposition 4 and more
clearly illustrates our exploration technique, we present it first.
Quasi-Balanced Outcomes are Stable
The proof of Proposition 5 makes use of the following lemma, which is proved in Appendix C.
Note that the structures in this lemma played a prominent role in [14] as well.
Lemma 7. Let G be a graph and let (M,x) be an outcome on G. If there is a subgraph H ⊆ G
that is an augmenting path, alternating cycle, flower, or bicycle (see Figure 3) such that
• for each uv ∈ H ∩M , xu + xv = wuv, and
• for each uv ∈ H \M , xu + xv < wuv,
then there exists a (possibly fractional) matching on G with weight strictly greater than M .
We now proceed with the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Propositon 5. We prove the contrapositive. Assume there exists an unstable edge uv ∈
M . If neither u nor v are matched, then M is not maximum. Without loss of generality, assume
u is matched and let u0 = u. Let u`, . . . , u0, . . . , ur be the set of vertices discovered by the
exploration algorithm, and let H ⊆ G be the subgraph of vertices and edges traversed. We first
prove that every edge uv ∈ H \M is unstable.
Specifically, we prove by induction that for 0 ≤ i ≤ br/2c, we have x2i−1 + x2i < w2i−1,2i,
and an equivalent argument holds for 0 ≥ i ≥ d(`+ 1)/2e. To prove the base case we show
u−1u0 is unstable. Note α0 ≥ wv0−xv, which implies x0−α0 ≤ x0 +xv−wv0 < 0. Specifically,
0 < α0, so u−1 exists and α0 = w−1,0 − x−1. Thus, x0 − (w−1,0 − x−1) = x0 − α0 < 0, or
equivalently x0 + x−1 < w−1,0. Hence u−1u0 is unstable.
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(a) augmenting path (b) alternating cycle (c) flower (d) bicycle
Figure 3: Witnesses that prove that M is not a maximum fractional matching.
Now let us assume u2i−3u2i−2 is an unmatched edge that is unstable and let us show that
u2i−1u2i is unstable. Since u2i−2u2i−1 is a matched edge, it is by assumption quasi-balanced.
Also, since u2i−3 ∼ u2i−2, it follows that α2i−2 ≥ w2i−3,2i−2−x2i−3. Hence, x2i−1+x2i = x2i−1+
w2i−1,2i − α2i−1 = x2i−2 − α2i−2 + w2i−1,2i ≤ x2i−2 − w2i−3,2i−2 + x2i−3 + w2i−1,2i < w2i−1,2i,
and thus u2i−1u2i is unstable. We conclude that every edge uv ∈ H \M is unstable.
Now consider H, and recall it takes the form of one of the six structures in Figure 2. We
consider each case, and show our desired conclusion. Since every unmatched edge in H is
unstable, we know αi > xi ≥ 0 for all i. Thus, H cannot be capped (Figure 2(a)). Now suppose
that H is a lollypop (Figure 2(b)) or a pretzel (Figure 2(f)). If H is a lollypop then by definition
it contains an alternating cycle. Alternately, if H is a pretzel then a simple parity argument
shows that one of its cycles must have even length, and must therefore be alternating.
Hence, H is either an augmenting path (Figures 2(c)), a flower (Figures 2(d)), a bicycle
(Figure 2(e)), or contains an alternating cycle. Since each unmatched edge is unstable, we
apply Lemma 7 to conclude that M is not a maximum fractional matching, thus proving the
contrapositive.
Fixed Points are Quasi-Balanced
To prove that fixed points are quasi-balanced, we begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Let x be a fixed point of the edge-balancing dynamics on a maximum matching M ,
and let u0u1 ∈ M be an unhappy edge with u1 saturated. Consider the vertices u0, u1, . . . , ur
discovered by the first part of the exploration algorithm. If ` ≤ r, then for any odd `:
1. For any j such that 0 ≤ j < b`/2c, we have
x` +
b`/2c∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i > x2j+1 +
b`/2c∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 .
2. x` > 0.
3. x` − α` ≤ x`−1 − α`−1.
4. α` > x`.
5. For any odd `′ < `, we have α` − x` ≥ α`′ − x`′ .
Alternatively, for any even `:
6. For ` ≥ 2, w`−1,` > x`−1 + x`.
7. For ` ≥ 2, we have α` > x`.
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8. For any j such that 0 ≤ j < `/2, we have
x` +
`/2−1∑
i=j
w2i,2i+1 <
`/2∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i .
Proof. We prove this lemma by joint induction on `. When ` = 0, Lemma 8(6) and Lemma 8(7)
do not apply (note that their proofs when ` = 2 only rely on ` = 1), and Lemma 8(8) holds
vacuously. Additionally, when ` = 1, Lemma 8(1) holds vacuously; Lemma 8(2) holds because
x1 = w0,1 > 0; Lemma 8(3) holds because x0 = 0 and α1 − α0 > w0,1 = x1; Lemma 8(4) holds
because α1 > x1 + α0 and α0 ≥ 0; and finally, Lemma 8(5) holds vacuously. Let us assume the
lemma holds for for all 0, . . . , ` − 1 where ` − 1 < r. We now show that the claims hold for `,
proving the inductive step.
First consider the case where ` is odd, and denote ` = 2k + 1:
Lemma 8(1): Let 0 ≤ j < k. We have
x` +
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i = x` + w`−2,`−1 +
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i
= (w`−1,` − x`−1) + w`−2,`−1 +
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i (u`−1u` ∈M)
> w`−1,` + x`−2 +
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i (Lemma 8(6), IH)
≥ w`−1,` + x2j+1 +
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 (Lemma 8(1), IH)
= x2j+1 +
k∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 .
Note that while we do use Lemma 8(6) for ` − 1, we know that ` ≥ 3, so this does not
present a problem.
Lemma 8(2): We have
x` > x1 +
k∑
i=1
w2i,2i+1 −
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i (Lemma 8(1), with j = 0)
=
k∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 −
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i (x1 = w0,1)
≥ 0 . (see below)
Note that the edges u0u1 and u`−1u` are both matched. Thus the last inequality follows
since M is a maximum matching.5
Lemma 8(3): Because x is a fixed point, u`−1u` is either balanced or unhappy with an endpoint
saturated. By Lemma 8(2), it cannot be unhappy with u`−1 saturated. Thus, it is either
balanced and x` − α` = x`−1 − α`−1 or it is unhappy with u` saturated. In the latter
case, note that x` + x`−1 = w`,`−1 < a` − a`−1 by definition. Since x`−1 = 0, we have
x` − α` < x`−1 − α`−1, as desired.
5The trivial proof of this statement is included in Lemma 10 in Appendix C for completeness.
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Lemma 8(4): From Lemma 8(3), we have α` ≥ x` − x`−1 + α`−1. By Lemma 8(7) for ` − 1
we know α`−1 > x`−1. Hence α` > x`.
Lemma 8(5): First consider `′ = `−2. By Lemma 8(3), we have α`−x` ≥ α`−1−x`−1. Since
u`−2 ∼ u`−1, we have α`−1 ≥ w`−1,`−2 − x`−2. Hence α` − x` ≥ w`−1,`−2 − x`−2 − x`−1 =
α`−2 − x`−2 by our choice of u`−1. Thus, α` − x` ≥ α`−2 − x`−2. By the induction
hypothesis, this holds for all odd `′ < ` as desired.
Now consider the case where ` is even, and denote ` = 2k:
Lemma 8(6): By our choice of u`, we know w`−1,` = α`−1 + x`. By Lemma 8(4), we have
α`−1 > x`−1. Thus w`−1,` > x`−1 + x` as desired.
Lemma 8(7): Because u`−1 ∼ u` and u`−1u` 6∈ M , we have α` ≥ w`−1,` − x`−1. By
Lemma 8(6) we have α` > x` as desired.
Lemma 8(8): We have
x` +
k−1∑
i=j
w2i,2i+1 = x` + x`−1 + x`−2 +
k−2∑
i=j
w2i,2i+1
≤
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i + x`−1 + x` (see below)
< w`−1,` +
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i (Lemma 8(6))
=
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i .
The first inequality follows by the inductive hypothesis of Lemma 8(8) if ` = 2k ≥ 4. If
` = 2k = 2, it follows because x`−2 = x0 = 0.
Note that each case of the above lemma relies only on previous cases, or on the inductive
hypothesis. Thus this concludes the proof.
We can now proceed with the proof of the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the contrapositive. Recall that the only unhappy edges that
appear in a fixed point must be saturated. Suppose u0u1 ∈ M is unhappy with u1 saturated.
Consider the structure formed by the vertices u0, u1, . . . , ur of the exploration algorithm started
at u0. Note that if the algorithm ends because ur is a previously labeled vertex, then for
some s ≥ 0 the sequence us, . . . , ur forms an even alternating cycle or a blossom (odd cycle).
Alternately, the algorithm ends with ur either capped or unmatched. We examine each possible
case:
• If ur is capped (Figure 2(a)): From Lemma 8(4) we know that αi > xi ≥ 0 for all odd
i ≥ 0. Hence, by the definition of the exploration algorithm this cannot occur.
• If ur is unmatched: By Lemma 8(8) with j = 0 and ` = r we know
r/2−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 <
r/2∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i .
Since u0 is matched to u1, and ur is not matched at all, M is not a maximum matching.5
• If us, . . . , ur forms an even alternating cycle for some 0 ≤ s < r (Figure 2(b)):
First suppose us = u0, so u0, . . . , ur forms a single alternating cycle, and r is even. By
Lemma 8(5), αr−1 − xr−1 ≥ α1 − x1. Since x0 = 0, and ur = u0, we know αr−1 = wr−1,0.
Because ur−1 is adjacent to u0, we have α0 ≥ wr−1,0 − xr−1. Hence α0 ≥ α1 − x1, and
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x1 = w0,1 implies α1 − α0 ≤ w0,1, contradicting the fact that u0u1 is unhappy with u1
saturated.
Otherwise, we have an alternating cycle where 0 < s. Note that r is even since any
preceding us is already matched. If r is even, then s is also even, and by Lemma 8(8) with
j = s/2 and ` = r, we know
r/2−1∑
i=s/2
w2i,2i+1 <
r/2∑
i=s/2+1
w2i−1,2i .
Thus, M is not a maximum matching.5
• If us, . . . , ur form a blossom: We know that r = 2k must be even and s = 2k′ − 1 (where
k′ < k) must be odd. Note that although us . . . ur forms a blossom and u0u1 . . . us forms
a stem, the bottommost edge is matched. Hence this is not equivalent to a flower, and
Lemma 7 does not apply. Nevertheless, we can argue in a similar way to its proof by
constructing a fractional y matching of weight higher than M . This is done as follows.
ye =

1 if e = uiui+1 6∈M for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k′ − 2
1
2 if e = uiui+1 for 2k
′ − 1 ≤ i ≤ 2k − 1
1 if e ∈M but e not in explored structure
0 otherwise
.
This places weight 1/2 on the edges in the blossom, weight 1 the edges of the stem which
are not in M . We wish to show that
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
1
2
r−1∑
i=s
wi,i+1 >
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 ,
or equivalently
2
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
k∑
i=k′
w2i−1,2i > 2
k′−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
k−1∑
i=k′
w2i,2i+1 .
We have
2
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
k∑
i=k′
w2i−1,2i
> 2
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
(
k−1∑
i=k′
w2i−1,2i + x2k−1
)
+ x2k (Lemma 8(6))
> 2
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
(
k−1∑
i=k′
w2i,2i+1 + x2k′−1
)
+ x2k (Lemma 8(1), ` = 2k − 1)
= 2
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i + x2k′−1
+ k−1∑
i=k′
w2i,2i+1 (u2k = u2k′−1)
= 2
k′−1∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i − x2k′−2 + w2k′−2,2k′−1
+ k−1∑
i=k′
w2i,2i+1 (u2k′−2,2k′−1 matched)
≥ 2
k′−2∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 + w2k′−2,2k′−1
+ k−1∑
i=k′
w2i,2i+1 (see below)
= 2
k′−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
k−1∑
i=k′
w2i,2i+1 .
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The last inequality follows from Lemma 8(8) if k′ ≥ 2, and if k′ = 1, it follows because
x2k′−2 = x0 = 0. Hence, we conclude that M is not a maximum weighted fractional
matching.
Thus, in all cases M is not a maximum fractional matching, and we have proved the contra-
positive.
4 Convergence
In this section, we prove Theorem 2. Note the statement of the theorem holds for any G = (V,E)
and M , although as previously stated, if M is not a maximum fractional matching then the
point we converge to is not balanced. In this section, let n = |V | and m = |E|.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let W = max {wuv : uv ∈ E}, so a valid allocation x is a point in [0,W ]n.
Consider the multiset S = {xv : v ∈ V } ∪ {xu + xv − wuv : uv ∈ E}. We call the values in S
the slacks of x. Let s = s(x) ∈ [−W, 2W ]n+m be the vector obtained by sorting the values in S
in non-decreasing order. Define the potential function Φ : [−W, 2W ]n+m → R by
Φ(s) =
n+m∑
i=1
2−isi.
We first show the value of Φ converges as we run the edge-balancing dynamics, and then prove
this implies the convergence of x. We know the entries of s are at most 2W , so Φ(s) ≤ 2W for
any such slack vector. We now show that Φ is monotonically increasing as we bargain, and thus
converges.
Assume x is not fixed, and let x′ be the allocation obtained from one step of the balancing
dynamics. Let uv ∈ M be the edge selected for this step, and suppose that x′u = xu + ε (and
thus x′v = xv − ε) for some ε > 0. Note that the slacks that change are those corresponding to
edges adjacent to u or v (except for uv), and the vertices u and v. Additionally, each such slack
changes by exactly ε, and thus ‖x− x′‖∞ = ‖s− s′‖∞ = ε.
For any au ∈ E where a 6= v we have xu − αu ≤ xu − (wa,u − xa) = xa + xu − wa,u and
xu − αu ≤ xu. Similarly, for any bv ∈ E where b 6= u, we have xv − αv ≤ xv − (wb,v − xb) =
xb + xv − wb,v and xv − αv ≤ xv. Note that since xu < x′u we know that x′u 6= 0. Thus, either
|αu − αv| ≤ wu,v, or αu − αv > wu,v. In either case, xu < x′u ≤ 12 (wu,v + αu − αv). Since
xu = wu,v − xv, we have xu + (wu,v − xv) < wu,v +αu −αv, or equivalently xu −αu < xv −αv.
Hence, before the balancing step, the minimum slack that will change is xu − αu. (Note that
when u has degree 1 this is simply xu.) Similarly, after the balancing step, we can show that
x′u−αu is the minimum slack that changed. Hence, Φ(s′)−Φ(s) ≥ (x′u−xu)2−(m+n) = ε2−(m+n).
We conclude that Φ is increasing, and thus convergent.
However, Φ is simply a function of the vector x. Its convergence does not necessarily imply
the convergence of x. This is not hard to show, however. First, since Φ converges, the quan-
tity 2n+mΦ must also converge and is therefore Cauchy. Because 2n+mΦ(s′) − 2n+mΦ(s) ≥
ε = ‖x′ − x‖∞, the vector x is Cauchy under the `∞ norm. Therefore, as the edge-balancing
dynamics proceed, x converges to a point in [0,W ]n.
Thus the edge-balancing dynamics converge regardless of the sequence of edges chosen. How-
ever, without a non-starvation condition, it is possible that we will not converge to a fixed point
of the dynamics. Despite this fact, it suffices for every edge to be considered an infinite number
of times. Assume for the sake of contradiction that we converge to a point z that is not fixed.
Since Φ is increasing, we know Φ(x) ≤ Φ(z) for all intermediate x. Additionally, since z is not
a fixed point, there exists some edge uv that is not quasi-balanced or saturated. Let ε be such
that uv is ε-quasi-balanced in allocation z. Since both Φ and x converge, we can proceed until
uv is at least ε/2 unbalanced and Φ(z) − Φ(x) < ε2−(n+m)/4 for all remaining allocations x.
Since the non-starvation condition ensures that uv be balanced eventually, at some point Φ(x)
must increase by at least ε2−(n+m)/2, and Φ(x) > Φ(z), which gives a contradiction. Hence we
converge to a fixed point of the dynamics.
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Recall that while the dynamics always converge, they may not reach a fixed point in a finite
amount of time. However, if we fix some ε and modify the edge-balancing dynamics so that
edges only balance if they are not ε-quasi-balanced or ε-close to saturated, then Φ must increase
by at least ε2−(n+m) in each step. In addition to preventing starvation, this shows a convergence
time of 2Wε · 2n+m for these dynamics. We do not know if this bound is tight, and present this
as a significant open problem.
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A The Matching BP Algorithm as a Bargaining Process
In this section we describe a distributed algorithm for computing a maximum matching on a
graph, and show that it can be viewed naturally as a bargaining process in the network exchange
setting. Hence, this algorithm can be thought of as a phase that precedes our balancing process
in which the players decide who they will partner with.
The algorithm is a max-product form of belief propagation. It was introduced for maximum
matching on bipartite graphs by Bayati, Shah, and Sharma [4] and for maximum matching on
general graphs by Bayati et al. [5] and independently by Sanghavi, Malioutov, and Willsky [19].
The algorithm is iterative; in each round every player sends a message to each of its neighbors.
If atu→v is the message that player u sends player v at time t, then a
t
u→v is computed recursively
as follows:
atu→v = max
{
max
q∼u,q 6=v
{
wq,u − at−1q→u
}
, 0
}
.
The messages are initialized to 0 at time 0. The algorithm ends when these messages converge
to some fixed values a∗u→v for all pairs of neighbors (u, v) (if this does indeed happen). If the
algorithm converges, then a matching M is chosen where {u, v} ∈M if and only if a∗u→v+a∗v→u ≤
wuv. The main result of [5] and [19] is that this process converges if and only if the maximum
fractional matching is integral (assuming that the edge weights have been perturbed so that the
maximum fractional matching is unique).
In our network exchange context, we interpret the message atu→v as the disagreement point
that player u has when bargaining with player v over the value of an exchange on edge uv. Note
that this message is computed in a way that is consistent with this interpretation: it is the
maximum value u can get by executing an exchange with a neighbor other than v and offering
that neighbor the same value that he is currently getting. (As before, u does not have to make
an exchange with any of its neighbors, so it can always guarantee itself a value of at least 0.)
Also note that under this interpretation two players match with each other at convergence if
and only if they have positive surplus. Finally, note that this process converges exactly in the
case that makes sense in our context: when a stable outcome exists.
B Proof of Proposition 6
In this section, we prove Proposition 6 and show that the result is tight, to within a constant
factor.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let uv be the edge that maximizes wu′,v′ − xu′ − xv′ for all unmatched
edges u′v′. Let δ = wu,v − xu − xv. To prove that x is (nε)-stable, it suffices to show that
δ ≤ nε. Since M is a maximum matching, at least one of u and v is matched. Without loss of
generality, assume u0 = u is matched. Consider the exploration algorithm, and let H ⊆ G be
the vertices u`, . . . , u0, . . . , ur and edges traversed by the algorithm.
We first prove the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Any edge ab ∈ H \M satisfies xa + xb ≤ wa,b − δ + (n− 1)ε.
Proof. We prove a stronger claim: for 0 ≤ i ≤ br/2c, x2i−1 + x2i ≤ w2i−1,2i − δ + iε (and a
similar statement holds for 0 ≥ i ≥ d(`+ 1)/2e). The proof of this claim is by induction on i.
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The base case is when i = 0. Since u0 ∼ v, we have α0 = w−1,0 − x−1 ≥ w0,v − xv = x0 + δ.
Hence, x−1 + x0 ≤ w−1,0 − δ. (In fact, by the definition of u = u0 and v, this implies that
x−1 + x0 = w−1,0 − δ.)
Now suppose that the claim holds for i−1. That is, suppose that x2i−3+x2i−2 ≤ w2i−3,2i−2−
δ + (i− 1)ε. Since u2i−3 ∼ u2i−2, it follows that α2i−2 ≥ w2i−3,2i−2 − x2i−3. Thus, we have
x2i−1 + x2i = x2i−1 + w2i−1,2i − α2i−1 (by choice of u2i)
≤ w2i−1,2i + x2i−2 − α2i−2 + ε (ε-quasi-balanced)
≤ w2i−1,2i + x2i−2 − w2i−3,2i−2 + x2i−3 + ε (from above)
≤ w2i−1,2i − δ + iε (IH),
as desired.
By an analogous argument, we can show that for 0 ≥ i ≥ d(`+ 1)/2e, we have x2i−1 +
x2i ≤ w2i−1,2i − δ + iε. Hence, every edge ab ∈ H \ M satisfies xa + xb ≤ wab − δ +
max{|d(`+ 1)/2e|, br/2c}ε ≤ wab − δ + (n− 1)ε.
With the lemma proved, we consider the possible types of structures H (see Figure 2). Since
M is a maximum matching, we can use the standard matching results shown in Appendix C to
show that δ ≤ nε in every case as follows:
• Suppose that H is capped (Figure 2(a)). Without loss of generality, assume ur−1ur is
matched. Hence, αr = 0, and xr − αr = xr ≥ 0. Because ur−1ur is ε-balanced, xr−1 −
αr−1 ≥ −ε. Since ur−1 ∼ ur−2, we have αr−1 ≥ wr−2,r−1−xr−2. From this and Lemma 9,
we have
0 ≤ xr−1 − αr−1 + ε ≤ xr−1 − wr−2,r−1 + xr−2 + ε ≤ −δ + nε ,
and hence δ ≤ nε as desired.
• Suppose that H is a lollypop (Figure 2(b)) or a pretzel (Figure 2(f)). If it is the latter,
then a simple parity argument shows that one of the cycles of H must have even length.
Thus in either case, H contains an even alternating cycle. Relabel the vertices of this cycle
v0, v1, . . . , v2k, where v2k = v0 and v0v1 ∈M . By Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, we have
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) ≤
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i − kδ + knε ≤
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 − kδ + knε .
On the other hand,
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) =
k−1∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) =
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 .
Combining the above and dividing by k yields δ ≤ nε as desired.
• Suppose that H is an augmenting path (Figure 2(c)). Relabel the vertices of the augment-
ing path v0, v1, . . . , v2k+1. By Lemma 9 and Lemma 10, we have
k∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) ≤
k∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 − (k + 1)δ + (k + 1)nε
≤
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i − (k + 1)δ + (k + 1)nε .
On the other hand, since x0 = x2k+1 = 0, we have
k∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) =
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) =
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i .
Combining the above and dividing by k + 1 yields δ ≤ nε as desired.
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• Suppose that H is a flower (Figure 2(d)). Relabel the vertices of the flower starting at
the bottom of the stem by v0, v1, . . . , v2k, . . . , v2`+1, where v2k = v2`+1. By Lemma 9 and
Lemma 11, we know
2
k−1∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) +
∑`
i=k
(x2i + x2i+1)
≤ 2
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
∑`
i=k
w2i,2i+1 − (k + `+ 1)δ + (k + `+ 1)nε
≤ 2
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i − (k + `+ 1)δ + (k + `+ 1)nε .
On the other hand, since x0 = 0 and x2k = x2`+1, we have
2
k−1∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) +
∑`
i=k
(x2i + x2i+1) = 2
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) +
∑`
i=k+1
(x2i−1 + x2i)
= 2
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i .
Combining the above and dividing by (k + `+ 1) yields δ ≤ nε as desired.
• Finally, suppose that H is a bicycle. Relabel the vertices by
v0, . . . , v2j+1, . . . , v2k, . . . , v2`+1 ,
such that v0 = v2j+1 and v2k = v2`+1. By Lemma 9 and Lemma 12, we have
2
k−1∑
i=j+1
(x2i + x2i+1) +
j∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) +
∑`
i=k
(x2i + x2i+1)
≤ 2
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 +
j∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
∑`
i=k
w2i,2i+1 − (`+ k − j)δ + (`+ k − j)nε
≤ 2
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i +
j∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i − (`+ k − j)δ + (`+ k − j)nε .
On the other hand,
2
k−1∑
i=j+1
(x2i + x2i+1) +
j∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) +
∑`
i=k
(x2i + x2i+1)
= 2
k∑
i=j+1
(x2i−1 + x2i) +
j∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) +
∑`
i=k+1
(x2i−1 + x2i)
= 2
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i +
j∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i .
Combining the above and dividing by (`+ k − j) yields δ ≤ nε as desired.
Thus, in all cases, we have shown that δ ≤ nε, and hence x is (nε)-stable.
Note that this result is tight to within a constant factor even for unweighted graphs. We
present a family of graphs proving this fact: Consider an unweighted lollypop consisting of
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2k+ 1 vertices v0, u1, v1, u2, v2, . . . , uk, vk where u1, v1, . . . , uk, vk form an alternating cycle, and
v0 is adjacent only to u1. (Hence ujvj is matched for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.) Let ε = 4/(k2 + 4k + 4),
and consider the allocation x given by xuj = 1 − j(k + 2 − j)ε and xvj = j(k + 2 − j)ε for
1 ≤ j ≤ k. It can be checked that every vertex gets an amount between 0 and 1, so this is a
valid allocation. It can also be checked that this allocation is (2ε)-quasi-balanced. However,
xv0 + xu1 = xu1 = 1− (k + 1)ε, and therefore this allocation is not δ-stable for any δ = o(nε).
C Structural Lemmas on Maximum Matchings
For completeness, we present proofs for some known structural results on maximum matchings [2,
14]. The pertinent structures are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Lemma 10. Let G be a graph and M a maximum weighted matching on G. Let H ⊆ G be an
alternating cycle, or an alternating path whose endpoints are not matched outside of H. Then
w(H \M) ≤ w(H ∩M).
Proof. Let M ′ = M 4H. Since H is either a cycle, or its endpoints are not matched outside of
H, we know M ′ is a valid matching. The lemma follows because w(M) ≥ w(M ′).
Lemma 11. Let M be a maximum matching on G; suppose that M is also a maximum fractional
matching; and let H = u0, u1, . . . , u2k, . . . , u2`+1 be the vertices of a flower (in order), where
u2k = u2`+1. Then
2
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
∑`
i=k
w2i,2i+1 ≤ 2
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i .
Proof. Consider the fractional matching y given by
ye =

1 if e ∈M \ (M ∩H)
1 if e = u2iu2i+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
1
2 if e = uiui+1 for 2k ≤ i ≤ 2`
0 otherwise
.
Because M is a maximum fractional matching, 2w(M) ≥ 2w(y). Hence,
2
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i + 2
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i ≥ 2
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
2∑`
i=2k
wi,i+1 ,
which can be rearranged to yield the lemma.
Lemma 12. Let M be a maximum matching on G; suppose that M is also a maximum fractional
matching; and let H = u0, . . . , u2j+1, . . . , u2k, . . . , u2`+1, be the vertices of a bicycle (in order),
where u0 = u2j+1 and u2k = u2`+1. Then
2
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 +
j∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
∑`
i=k
w2i,2i+1
≤ 2
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i +
j∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i .
Proof. Consider the fractional matching y given by
ye =

1 if e ∈M \ (M ∩H)
1 if e = u2iu2i+1 for j + 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1
1
2 if e = uiui+1 for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2j
1
2 if e = uiui+1 for 2k ≤ i ≤ 2`
0 otherwise
.
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Because M is a maximum fractional matching, 2w(M) ≥ 2w(y). Hence,
2
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i + 2
j∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i + 2
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i
≥ 2
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 +
2j∑
i=0
wi,i+1 +
2∑`
i=k
wi,i+1 ,
which can be rearranged to yield the lemma.
Lemmas 10, 11, and 12 allow us to prove Lemma 7, from Section 3.
Proof of Lemma 7. Suppose that H is an augmenting path. Label the vertices in this path
u0, u1, . . . , u2k+1. Since u0 and u2k+1 are unmatched, we have x0 = x2k+1 = 0, and
k∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 >
k∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) =
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) =
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i .
Hence by Lemma 10, M is not maximum.
Now suppose that H is an alternating cycle. Label the vertices in this cycle u0, u1, . . . , u2k−1
such that u0u1 ∈M . Also, define u2k to be the vertex u0. We have
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i >
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) =
k−1∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) =
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 .
Hence, by Lemma 10, M is not maximum.
Now suppose that H is a flower. Label the vertices in the stem of the flower by u0, u1, . . . , u2k
and label the vertices in the blossom by u2k, u2k+1, . . . , u2`+1 (where u2`+1 = u2k). Since x0 = 0,
we have
2
k−1∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
∑`
i=k
w2i,2i+1 > 2
k−1∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) +
∑`
i=k
(x2i + x2i+1)
= 2
k∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) +
∑`
i=k+1
(x2i−1 + x2i)
= 2
k∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i .
Hence, by Lemma 11, M is not a maximum fractional matching.
Finally, suppose thatH is a bicycle. Label the vertices in the first blossom by u0, u1, . . . , u2j+1
(where u2j+1 = u0); label the vertices in the stem by u2j+1, u2j+2, . . . , u2k; and label the vertices
in the second blossom by u2k, u2k+1, . . . , u2`+1 (where u2`+1 = u2k). We have
2
k−1∑
i=j+1
w2i,2i+1 +
j∑
i=0
w2i,2i+1 +
∑`
i=k
w2i,2i+1
> 2
k−1∑
i=j+1
(x2i + x2i+1) +
j∑
i=0
(x2i + x2i+1) +
∑`
i=k
(x2i + x2i+1)
= 2
k∑
i=j+1
(x2i−1 + x2i) +
j∑
i=1
(x2i−1 + x2i) +
∑`
i=k+1
(x2i−1 + x2i)
= 2
k∑
i=j+1
w2i−1,2i +
j∑
i=1
w2i−1,2i +
∑`
i=k+1
w2i−1,2i .
Hence, by Lemma 12, M is not a maximum fractional matching.
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